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The last ten years have proven to be significant for the world of science.
Thousands of genes have been located on chromosomes by researchers from the
Human Genome Project ("HGP").' Their research has led to the location of genes
responsible for conditions including, but not limited to, cystic fibrosis,2
Huntington's disease,3 some breast and ovarian cancers,4 and some forms of
* 3D. Candidate, 1999, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.B.A, 1996,
University ofNotre Dame. I would like to thank the following peoplelorganizations who aided in
developing this proposal: Midwest Alliance for Health Education; Barrett & McNagny, Attorneys
at Law, Richard D. Robinson, Esq.; Eleni Z. Angelopoulos, Esq.; Patricia .Bader, M.D.; Donald
C. Chambers, M.D.; John P. Gemi; Professors Roger Dworkin and Susan Stuart; J. Michael
Keefer, Esq.; William M. Daly, and Daniel F. McCarthy.
1. The HOP is a multibillion dollar initiative designed to map and sequence the genes in the
human genome. See Heather McClure, The Insurance Industry's Use of Genetic Information:
Legal andEthical Concerns, 28. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 231,231 (1995); Lori Whittaker, Clinical
Applications of Genetic Tesfing: Implicationsfor the Family Physician, 53 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN
2077, 2077 (1996), available in LEXIS, GENMED Library, AFP File. The genome of an
organism consists of its haploid set of chromosomes. Humans have 23 pairs of chromosomes (or
46 total chromosomes). The 23 pairs of chromosomes are known as a diploid set of chromosomes.
Each parent donates one set of chromosomes from the pair (known as a haploid set) to the
offspring, giving it a diploid set (one haploid set from each parent). Genes are located on each
haploid set and are responsible for bodily functions. The HOP is focused on finding the location
of human genes on each chromosome in the haploid set See JAMES W. FRISTROM & PHILIP T.
SPIETH, PRINCIPLES OF GENETICs 47,132-33 (1980); NATIONAL CANCER INST., U.S. DEP'T OF
HATHAND HUMAN SER.VS., UNDERSTANDING GENE TESTING 2 (1995).
2. Cystic fibrosis ("CF) is one of the most common genetic disorders causing death in the
white population. Pulmonary disease is responsible for 90% of CF-related deaths. Liver disease,
trauma, and suicide are responsible for the other 5% of CF-related deaths. See generally Garry R.
Cutting, Cystic Fibrosis, in 1 EMERY AND RIMOIN's PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICAL
GENETICS 268 (David L. Rimoin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter MEDICAL GENETICS]
(discussing symptoms, genetic structure, diagnosis, and management of CF).
3. Huntington's disease ("HD") causes a gradual deterioration of physical and mental
capabilities around the age of 40 and lasts for about 15 years, until death. See generally Michael
R. Haydn & Barry Kremer, Basal Ganglia Disorders, in 2 MEDICAL GENETICS, supra note 2,
at 2197, 2203-09 (discussing symptoms, diagnosis, genetic counseling, and management of
Huntington's Disease).
4. Present studies have shown that, although the majority of breast and ovarian cancers
develop sporadically, a small percentage (approximately 5-10%) of these cancers are genetically
related. See generally C. Michael Steel, Cancer of the Breast and Female Reproductive Tract,
in 1 MEDICAL GENETICS, supra note 2, at 1501, 1501-23 (discussing the genetic mapping of
heritable breast cancer).
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Alzheimer's disease.' Tests for these, and many other genetic disorders, are
becoming more readily available and could soon become inexpensive.
Questions arise as to whether employers, insurance companies, and the
government may access an individual's genetic information resulting from such
tests. The insurers' ability to access this information has received a great deal of
attention.' More specifically, may an insurance company classify its applicants
based on their genetic makeup? Many different views have been expressed to
answer this question." On one hand, insurance companies, particularly life insurers,
believe that they should be entitled to genetic information if the risk classification
process is to survive." Insurers believe that widespread fraud would result from the
ability to withhold genetic information, raising the premiums for all policyholders."
Consumers, 2 on the other hand, believe that allowing insurers' access to genetic
information would violate rights of privacy, prevent patients from getting needed
help, and lead to widespread discrimination against applicants. 3 These debates
have resulted in legislative intervention at the state level.'4 Federal legislation has
also been proposed,' however, no significant efforts have been passed directly
relating to this issue.
5. Alzheimer's disease is different from other genetically related diseases in that there are
different copies of the same gene. If one of the copies of the gene is received from the parent, the
process ofAlzheimer's is hastened. See generally Allen D. Roses & Margaret A. Pericak-Vance,
Alheimer Diseaye and Other Dementias, in 2 MEDICAL GENLrncs, supra note 2, at 1807, 1807-
20 (discussing symptoms, diagnosis, genetic counseling, and management ofAlzheimer's disease).
6. As of 1995, tests for cystic fibrosis, Duchenne/Becker muscular dystrophy, hemophilia,
Gaucher's disease, Huntington's disease, Lou Gehrig's disease, Tay Sachs disease, and thalassemia
(among others) were available. See McClure, supra note 1, at 232-33. As of 1996, tests for the
presence of the BRCA1 mutation, which predisposes a person to breast or ovarian cancer, were
commercially available, and tests to determine the predisposition to Alzheimer's were being
developed. See PEoPLE'S MED. Soc'Y, INC., GENETIc TESTING: THE CONTROVERSIAL
BACKGROUND CHECK 16 (1997).
7. Cystic fibrosis tests, which cost around $400 in 1993, cost around $125-$150 in 1995, and
cost even less in 1997. (The Michigan State University Genetics Clinic quoted a price of S52 for
a cystic fibrosis canier screening test) Ifthis trend continues, it is predicted that these tests will cost
five to ten dollars. See Alfred G. Haggerty, Genetic Advances Are Seen As Boon for Insurers,
NAT'L UND RWRrRS, Mar. 15, 1993, at 25, 25 (Life & Health-Financial Services ed.).
8. Many articles have been published dealing with this subject. For a comprehensive
examination, se Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the InsurancelGenetic Fair/Unfair Discrimination
Dilemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 KY. L.J. 503 (1997).
9. See id. at 531-78.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 87-93.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 90-91.
12. Although many consumers side with insurers with regard to this issue, the insurers'
opposition will be referred to as "consumers" for purposes of objectivity.
13. See generally Carol Lee, Comment, Creating a Genetic Underclass: The Potentialfor
Genetic Discrimination by the Health Insurance Industry, 13 PACE L. REv. 189 (1993)
(addressing the potential for abuse of genetic testing by both insurers and private citizens).
14. See Holmes, supra note 8, at 629-44.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 123-34.
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State legislators have addressed this issue by introducing and passing laws that
define the rights of insurers and consumers. 16 Some states narrowly define the
protection insurers and consumers can expect to receive, focusing on specific types
of insurance and genetic disorders. Other states have addressed the issue through
broad legislation, covering all types of insurance and genetic disorders.17
The states' right to regulate the insurance industry was premised on public
policy. 8 However, public policy now calls for federal treatment of this social
dilemma, as state regulation has provided little protection to the life insurer and
consumer with regard to accessing genetic information. Therefore, this Comment
calls for the establishment of a federal subagency to develop regulations, as well as
to update those regulations when genetic research and advances deem it necessary.
This Comment will begin by introducing some of the basic concepts of genetics
and insurance (particularly life insurance). Next, it will show how these concepts
interrelate to affect both life insurers and consumers. The final focus of this effort
is to demonstrate that developing and updating risk factors ("RFs") for each
individual genetic disorder discovered, to be incorporated into each life insurer's
premium valuation process, is an ideal step toward alleviating the stresses between
the life insurer and consumer with regard to accessing genetic information.
I. THE BAsIcs OF GENETICS
Genes exist in strands of DNA, which carry all the information about our bodies
and how they function.' 9 There are forty-six molecules of DNA in each human cell
which coil into the condensed "double helix" shape.2" These coiled DNA strands,
or chromosomes, can be found in twenty-three pairs-twenty-two autosomes (non-
sex determining chromosomes) and one pair of sex chromosomes which determines
the sex of the individual.2 An individual receives one set of twenty-three
chromosomes (twenty-two autosomes and one sex chromosome) from each parent.22
The forty-six molecules of DNA contain between 50,000 and 100,000 genes,
each of which provides instructions to the cells regarding bodily functions.' Some
genes instruct cells to produce proteins which aid in the development of the
embryo, some are responsible for diversifying the cells (for example, making a bone
16. See Holmes, supra note 8, at 629-44.
17. See infra text accompanying note 135.
18. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, which passed on March 9,1945, declared that it was in the
public's interest for states to regulate the insurance industry, and therefore gave the states that
power. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1012 (1994).
19. DNA is a "vast chemical information database" which holds the instructions for making
all the products (proteins) a cell will need to carry on bodily functions. Genes within the DNA
instruct a particular protein to be produced. NATIONAL CANCER INsT., supra note 1, at 1-2.
20. James Watson and Francis Crick were credited with developing the model for the double
helix structure in 1953. See RICHARD V. KoWLES, GENETIcS, SOCIETY, & DECISIONS 22 (1985).
21. See NATIONAL CANCERINST., supra note 1, at 2,25,30.
22. See id. at2, 30.
23. See id. at 2. 'Troteins are the molecules responsible for catalyzing most intracellular
chemical reactions (enzymes), for regulating gene expression (regulatory proteins), and for
determining many features of the structures of cells, tissues, and viruses (structural proteins)."
LEONA. SNYDERETAL., GENERAL GENETICS 307 (1985) (parentheticals in original).
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cell and brain cell differ in characteristics), and some produce proteins necessary
for everyday bodily functions.2
Genetic disorders may occur when there is a mutated gene25 which leads the cell
to produce aberrant proteins or other gene products which may obstruct efficient
bodily performance. 6 Sometimes full segments of DNA may be missing, multiplied,
or transposed (found on a different segment of the chromosome), resulting in a
missing gene, an extra gene, or a misplaced gene which alters the regular
production of gene products that the cell needs."' These mutations may be either
inherited or acquired. 8
Inherited mutations arise when one parent (or both) donates an aberrant gene in
the set of chromosomes passed on to the child.29 This mutation then replicates itself
as the cell multiplies inside the embryo, resulting in millions of cells containing the
flawed information." These mutations could then be passed down as the next
generation receives its set of chromosomes from the parent with the mutation?'
Such mutations may then lead to genetic disease. These disorders may be
classified as either "multifactorial" or "single-genel' genetic conditions.
Multifactorial conditions may never manifest themselves in the absence of certain
other factors. These conditions rely on the "interaction of numerous genetic and
environmental factors."' For example, a person may have a gene which makes him
susceptible to lung cancer. If he avoids smoking, he might not develop lung cancer.
In other words, .by eliminating the environmental factors, the disease may not
manifest itself."
In the case of single-gene diseases, such as cystic fibrosis and Huntington's
disease, the carrier received a gene in which the disease( will manifest itself
24. See NATIONAL CANCERINST., supra note 1, at 3.
25. Mutations are mistakes in the DNA information sequence. See SNYDERET AL., supra note
23, at 353-54. "Mutations are abrupt, heritable changes in single genes or small regions of a
chromosome."Id at 353.
26. See NATIONAL CANCER INST., supra note 1, at 4.
27. See id. at 5; see also KOWLus, supra note 20, at 84 (describing how the nucleotide
sequence of a gene can be altered); SNYDER ET AL., supra note 23, at 353-89 (providing a more
in-depth analysis of gene mutations).
28. See NATIONAL CANCERINT., supra note 1, at 5; see also KoWLEs, supra note 20, at 217-
19 (suggesting the "nature versus nurture" approach to a person's genotype (actual genetic
makeup) and their phenotype (physical expression of their genetic makeup, or genotype)). Kowles
instructs that a person's genome (nature) reflects his "potential phenotype." Id. at 218 (emphasis
in original). However, environmental factors (nurture) can influence the degree to which the
phenotype expresses itself. See id.
29. See NATIONAL CANCBR INST., supra note 1, at 5.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Donald C. Chambers, Genetic Testing and Insurance in the United States, MED.
REsouRcE (Lincoln Nat'l Reinsurance, Fort Wayne, Ind.), Oct 1994, at 3; see also SNYDER T
AL., supra note 23, at 566 ("Quantitative traits are often referred to as multifactorial traits in order
to emphasize the many genetic and environmental factors in their determination.") (emphasis in
original).
33. See KowLEs, supra note 20, at 233 (discussing oncogenes-genes which may cause
cancer if activated by, among other things, environmental factors).
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regardless of environmental factors. Hence, a single gene can cause the
manifestation of the symptoms."
At this point, it is important to distinguish between the terms "predisposed
genetic condition" and "presymptomatic genetic condition." People who are
predisposed to a genetic disease do not have the disease. Rather, they have an
increased likelihood that the disease will develop." The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") provides an excellent explanation of a
predisposed genetic condition:
"If your grandmother had heart disease, you may have a predisposition to heart
disease. And if your father has cancer, you may be predisposed to developing
cancer. However, the presence of these genetic characteristics does not indicate
that an individual has an impairment or a record of an impairment, or necessarily
that the individual may develop an impairment in the future."'36
Breast cancer, heart disease, lung cancer, alcoholism,37 and obesity are all examples
of predisposed genetic conditions.3" There is a possibility that someone with a
34. Parents pass on a particular copy of a gene to their offspring. As stated supra note 1, each
parent donates a haploid number of chromosomes to the offspring, giving it a diploid number. In
donating a haploid number of chromosomes, each parent donates one allele to the offspring. See
Brim R. Gin, Geneic Discriminaion: Huntington 's Disease and the Americans with Disabilities
Ac4 97 CoLUM.L.REv. 1406,1414 & n.45 (1997). The combination of the two alleles forms the
particular gene. See id. Huntington's disease only requires the presence of one allele in order for
the disease to manifest itself. (The dominant allele must be present in the pair for manifestation
of Huntington's.) See id. Suppose the dominant Huntington's allele will be represented by "H,"
and the recessive allele (which does not cause Huntington's), will be represented by "h." If each
parent donates h alleles, the offspring is considered homozygous recessive (hh) for Huntington's
and the disease will not manifest itself. See id. However, if one parent donates an H allele, and the
other parent donates an h allele, the offspring is considered heterozygous dominant (Rh) for
Huntington's and the disease will manifest itself, since the dominant allele, H, is present See id.
Cystic fibrosis occurs in the presence of a homozygous recessive pair of alleles. See Janet A.
Kobrin, Confidentiality of Genetic Information, 30 UCLAL. Rev. 1283,1289 & n.38 (1983).
Suppose the dominant allele for cystic fibrosis is "C," and the recessive allele is "c." If each parent
donates C alleles, a homozygous dominant pairing occurs (CC), and the disease does not manifest
itself. See id. If one parent donates a C allele, and the other parent donates a c allele, a
heterozygous dominant condition occurs (Cc), and the disease does not manifest. See id. However,
if each parent donates c alleles, a homozygous recessive condition occurs (cc), and the disease
manifests itself. See id.
Many different diseases require different pairings of alleles in order to manifest Some require
a homozygous dominant allele pair and some require a heterozygous dominant allele pair. See id.;
see also FhPxRoM & SPiu supra note 1, at 156-57; KoWLES, supra note 20, at 40-44; SNYDER
ET AL., supra note 23, at 8.
35. See Don Chambers, 'Predisposed'v& 'Presymptomatic': There's a Big Difference, MED.
REsouRCE (Lincoln Nat'l Reinsurance, Fort Wayne, Ind.), Jan.-Feb 1995, at 4.
36. Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct 29 Hous.L.REv. 23,46 (1992) (quoting Letter from Ronnie Blumenthal, Acting
Director of Communications and Legislative Affairs, EEOC, to Rep. Bob Wise, Chairman, House
Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice and Agriculture (Nov. 22,1991)).
37. See KOWLEs, supra note 20, at 380 (discussing alcoholism and heredity).
38. Predisposed genetic conditions may be multifactorial or single-gene. While a predisposition
to heart disease, lung cancer, and alcoholism may require the presence of environmental factors
for manifestation, a predisposition to some breast cancers, requiring the presence of the BRCAI
1999] 1379
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predisposition to one of the above conditions may never develop that condition. For
example, the carrier of the BRCAl gene, which predisposes an individual to breast
cancer, has around an 85% chance of developing breast cancer. 9 The carrier may
never develop breast cancer, however the presence of the mutation indicates an
increased risk for developing the disease.
On the other hand, people with presymptomatic genetic conditions will develop
the disease if they live long enough." An example of such a condition is
Huntington's disease. Although the carrier of the Huntington's mutation may not
develop symptoms for the disease for the first forty years of his life, symptoms will
eventually develop, regardless of outside factors." Once symptoms develop, the
carrier can be classified as symptomatic for the disease.
Another aspect of genetic diseases is the gene's penetrance and expressivity.
Some diseases express themselves more consistently than others. For example, the
BRCA1 gene results in breast cancer for 85% of the people who have it42
(predisposing them to breast cancer) while the Huntington's gene manifests itself
in nearly 100% of the people who have it43 (causing them to be presymptomatic for
Huntington's). The ability of a gene to express itself in a person is known as a
gene's penetrance." In the earlier example, the BRCAl gene is 85% penetrant,
while the Huntington's gene is nearly 100% penetrant.4" The Huntington's gene is
so penetrant that people are considered presymptomatic for the disease if they have
the gene. However, there are some cases where the Huntington's gene does not
express itself until very late in life.46 Expressivity deals with the degree and manner
in which the gene manifests itself once it has penetrated.47 A gene may express itself
differently in one individual relative to another, possibly leading to a more severe
genetic condition in that individual.
The discussion thus far has focused on inherited genetic diseases. Another family
of genetic diseases, "acquired" genetic diseases, arises from mutations that may
form spontaneously from environmental or age-related factors.49 Spontaneous
cancers are, acquired genetic disorders. The inherited BRCA1 gene is responsible
for approximately 5-10% of breast cancers, while 90-95% of breast cancers are
gene, does not require environmental factors in order for the gene to manifest itself. See Marne E.
B rm, Insurers and Genetic Testing:. Shoppingfor That Perfect Pair of Genes, 40 DRAKE L. REV.
121,123-24 (1991).
39. See Steel, supra note 4, at 1506 (providing a table of probabilities of developing breast or
ovarian cancer in the presence of the BRCA1 mutation).
40. See Chambers, supra note 35, at 4.
41. See id.
42. See PEoPLE's MED. Soc'Y, INC., supra note 6, at 1.
43. There have been no described cases of incomplete penetrance with Huntington's disease.
See Hayden & Kremer, supra note 3, at 2207.
44. See NoRmAN V. ROTHWELL, UNDERSTANDING GENETICS: A MOLECuLAR APPROACH 63
(1993).
45. See id.
46. Some patients have developed symptoms for Huntington's in their 80s and 90s. See
Hayden & Kremer, supra note 3, at 2203.
47. See ROTHWELL, supra note 44, at 63.
48. See id.
49. See NATIONAL CANCER INST., supra note 1, at 5.
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spontaneous genetic disorders." These non-BRCAl -related breast cancers may
occur when the cell is dividing itself and DNA is poorly transmitted to the sister
cell, although environmental factors such as radiation may be responsible for
spontaneously causing an error in the DNA."
The presence of these inherited and acquired genetic disorders can be determined
by analyzing an individual's DNA through genetic testing. The advent of genetic
testing has made it possible to determine whether an individual possesses a
particular genetic disorder, the nature and severity of that disorder, and the chances
that the disorder will be passed to that individual's offspring. 2
II. WHAT Is GENETIC TESTNG?
Testing for the presence of genes involves taking a person's cells and examining
their DNA. 3 Geneticists performing these tests focus on a particular segment of
DNA in order to find missing information sequences, added sequences, or
transposed sequences.5 4 Testing involves not only looking for altered genes, but
also looking for gene products which could signal an aberrant gene.5
Genetic testing is used to determine if a person is a carrier of a particular gene,
which then may lead to a determination of whether the person is predisposed to a
particular disease or presymptomatic for a particular disease. However, a person
may be neither predisposed nor presymptomatic. In such a case, he or she is just a
carrier of a particular allele, which is a different form of the same gene. 6 Since
some diseases, such as cystic fibrosis, require the presence of two of the same
alleles in order for the diseases to manifest themselves, a person possessing only
one of the requisite alleles is said to be a carrier of such a disease. Some diseases,
such as Huntington's disease, only require the presence of one particular allele for
manifestation.57
Tests can determine whether a person is a carrier of a dominant or recessive
allele,5" and therefore can inform the patient whether he may be predisposed or
presymptomatic for a particular disease. This kind of information helps the patient
know what genetic information can possibly be passed down to the next
generation.59 This information can also be used to determine the possibility of
50. See What You Need to Know Before Considering Genetic Testingfor Heritable Breast
Cancer, T-Nm-cWoRKNnws (NationalWomen's Health Network), Nov. 21,1996, at 3; see also
Steel, supra note 4, at 1506.
51. See NATIoNALCANcERINsT., supra note 1, at 5; see also KoWLEs, supra note 20, at 232-
33.
52. See NATIONAL CANCERINST., supra note 1, at 9,11-12.
53. See id. at8.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. eeFRTisrOM & SPMIE, supra note 1, at 156-57; see also KoWLES, supra note 20, at 4;
SNYDERET AL., supra note 23, at 8; supra note 34.
57.See ChambeM, supra note 35, at4; see also supra note 34 (discussing the required allele
pairings for different diseases).
58. See NATIONAL CANCER INST., supra note 1, at 9.
59. See id.
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mutant alleles in parents and siblings. It can even be used to track the potential for
a mutant gene in grandchildren.6
Genetic tests can be expensive. A 1995 report found that a cystic fibrosis test cost
between $125 and $150, a Huntington's disease test cost between $250 and $300,
and a Tay-Sachs test cost about $150.61 Commercial tests for breast and ovarian
cancer are available, and tests for Alzheimer's disease are being commercially
developed.62 As technology advances and more information is acquired about genes
and gene products, these tests could become less expensive.63
III. THE BAsIcs OF INSURANCE
Before proceeding on to the fundamentals of insurance, it is important to note that
the McCarran-Ferguson Act stated that it was in the public's interest for states to
regulate the insurance industry.64 As a result, "state laws enacted 'for the purpose
of regulating the business of insurance' do not yield to conflicting federal statutes
unless a federal statute specifically requires otherwise." 5 Congress has "explicitly
reserved the power to enact legislation relating to the business of insurance."66
There are generally two types of insurance at issue with regard to the genetic
testing conflict: health insurance and life insurance. Health insurance is designed
to pay immediate medical costs, such as doctor and hospital bills,67 and can be
packaged as an individual policy or a group policy. Under individual health
insurance, the insured is personally purchasing the insurance, while in group health
insurance, that person's employer owns the policy and he, as well as the other
employees, are covered as a group under the policy.s
Life insurance is essentially a contract in which the insurer agrees, in exchange
for a specified premium, to pay a determined amount of money to designated
beneficiaries upon the death of the insured.69 Whereas most health care policies are
group policies provided by employers,"0 most life insurance policies are individual
in nature.7 While health insurance may be considered a necessity, since it is the
60. These tests are known as predictive gene tests. See id. at 11.
61. See McClure, supra note 1, at 232-33.
62. See id.
63. See Haggerty, supra note 7, at 25.
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1012 (1994).
65. United States Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491,507 (1993) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §
1012(b) (1994)) (emphasis added).
66. Holmes, supra note 8, at 584.
67. Health insurance is generally defined as "insurance providing indemnification for losses
caused by illness." 1 LEE R. Russ & THoMAS F. SEGALLA, CoucH ON INSURANCE § 1:46 (3d ed.
1995).
68.See id. § 1:2.
69.See id. § 1:39.
70. See GENTc TESTWNGWRKING GROUP, NATIONAL Ass'N INS. CoMi'RS, REPORT OF TE





primary access to medical care for many individuals, 2 life insurance is more of a
property interest in that proceeds from the policy may be transferred to another
individual.7' However, it is imperative not to underestimate the importance of life
insurance, since it is the primary means of future financial planning for many
individuals. 4 Life insurance is generally regulated by the states as permitted by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.7 To date, there are no significant federal provisions
designed to regulate life insurance.
A. Risk Classification and Its Role in Life Insurance
Medical underwriting involves assessing the applicant's risk of accident,
sickness, or death, depending on the type of insurance policy for which the
individual applied.76 Individuals applying for life insurance experience the full
effects of medical underwriting and risk classification, since individual, and not
group, insurance is involved. Individual insurance applicants ("applicants"), at the
time they apply, are grouped together into risk classes and charged premiums7,
relative to the risk class they belong in; a person in a higher risk class is charged
a higher premium, while a person in a lower risk class is charged a lower
premium.7" Applicants are classified as "standard," "substandard," or "declined"79
based on personal risk relative to the risks of other policyholders. A person with a
standard rating may have a lower premium than a person with a substandard rating,
who may be refused insurance altogether.8 "
Once insured, persons who suffer a misfortune collect on their insurance; those
who avoid misfortune do not collect. If a large number of people suffer misfortunes
relative to the total number of people insured, overall premiums would have to rise
in order to guarantee that the unhealthy policyholders could collect and the insurers
could still stay in business.8 ' Premiums are part of an insurer's revenue-if the
72. See Richard A. Bornstein, Genetic Discrimination, Insurability and Legislation: A
Closing of the LegalLoopholes, 4 J.L. & PoL'Y 551,576-77 (1996).
73. A life insurance policy "may, in the absence of contrary legislation or contract provision,
be delivered and transferred as other personal property." Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 67, § 1:39.
74. See NAIC, supra note 70, at 8.
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1012 (1994).
76. See Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 67, § 1:2.
77. An insurer agrees to assume the risk of an applicant individually, or as a member in a group
ofernployees, in exchange for consideration from the individual. This consideration is known as
a premium, and may fluctuate based on that individual's personal level of risk, or on the risk within
the insured group. See id. § 69:1.
78. Insurance underwriters divide applicants into various risk groups to determine the
possibility and degree of loss that-the groups might cause the insurers. Risk classification helps to
clarify the rates insurers require to protect themselves from excessive losses and ensures that each
applicant pays a premium relative to the risk he projects. See MIcHAEL C. THoMsrTT, INsuRANcE
DICTIoNARY 186 (1989).
79. A person given a standard rating means that he is to be insured at the average rate. A
person given a substandard rating means that he is not qualified for standard policy rates. This will
lead the insurer to issue a higher premium, or deny the applicant altogether. See id. at 199, 201.
80. See id.
81. See ROBERT J. GiBBONS T AL., INSURANcEPERSPE~crlVE 69 (1992).
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insurance claims outweigh the revenues, the insurer might possibly become
insolvent.
As stated earlier, the McCarran-Ferguson Act allows states to regulate the
insurance industry.82 States have permitted insurers, through legislation, to
"discriminate" among applicants through risk classification. In general, risk
classification is considered "fair" discrimination."3 At this point, "fair"
discrimination and "unfair" (or "invidious") discrimination must be distinguished.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Telles v. Commissioner of
Insurance," (and most, if not all, courts in general) defined "unfair discrimination"
in the context of insurance as "that which treats individuals of the same class and
equal expectation of life differently." 5 Conversely, unequal treatment of insured
who were of different risk classifications resulted in "fair" discrimination.8"
Discrimination in premium setting results from the theory that the insurer knows
as much about the applicant's risk as the applicant does.87 However, there are
situations when there is an unlevel playing field, and the applicant knows more
about his risk than the insurer does. An example of this occurs when a person
checks the "nonsmoker" box on an application form when, in reality, he is a
smoker.88 This can lead to the insurers' inability to establish equitable premium
rates since records reflect a decrease in average risk. Therefore, insurance becomes
a bargain for those with greater risk, but it becomes a burden for those with lower
risk. This phenomenon is also known as adverse selection, or antiselection.8 9
Antiselection results in high-risk individuals purchasing more insurance than
those with minimal risk exposure." This could lead to overall premiums increasing
in order for insurers to protect themselves. Individuals with low risk exposure
might then seek out other insurers willing to charge premiums relative to their low
risk, leaving the initial insurer selling policies to high-risk individuals, who
continue to find the higher premiums a bargain for their risk."'
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1012 (1994).
83. See Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 67, § 69:38. "The basic principle underlying statutes
governing underwriting practices is that insurers have the right to classify risks and to elect not to
insure risks ifthe discrimination is fair." Life Ins. Ass'n v. Commissioner of Ins., 530 N.E.2d 168,
171 (Mass. 1988).
84. 574 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 1991).
85.Id. at 361-62.
86. See id. at 362.
87. The element ofrisk is not present when a party has knowledge of their medical future. See
Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 67, § 101:2.
88. "Of those who claim to be nonsmokers and thus stand to gain significantly in terms of
lower rates for their insurance, at least six percent of those who say 'I am a nonsmoker' are in fact
smokers." Interview with Donald C. Chambers, M.D., Senior Vice President and Chief'Medical
Director, Lincoln National Corporation, in Fort Wayne, Ind. (June 9, 1997) [hereinafter Chambers
Interview]. Dr. Chambers alluded to a test which measures the level of a metabolic byproduct of
cigarette nicotine in urine. See id.





The existence of antiselection led to the development of the Medical Information
Bureau ("MIB"), which alerts insurers to the possibility of antiselection. The MIB
was designed to "'protect the honest consumers against higher premiums which
would be necessary if the forgetful or dishonest applicants were too often
successful." 93 The underwriting process does limit the existence of antiselection,
since underwriters access physicians, employers, the MIB, and all other sources
relevant to the insurance contract, in order to classify risk accurately.
The advent of genetic testing has created a situation which could harm both the
life insurer and consumer. On the one hand, life insurers might use genetic
information obtained from testing to practice unfair discrimination. On the other
hand, consumers might withhold this genetic information from life insurers,
resulting in antiselection.
IV. GENETIC TESTING AFFECTS LIFE INSURERS AND
CONSUNMERS
As technological advances make genetic testing more commercially available and
accessible, there becomes a risk of an unlevel playing field. This occurs because
those who are at risk for genetic disease and get tested have knowledge that they
may possibly withhold from insurers. In other words, there is a potential for
antiselection.9" If there is a chance that an applicant will be denied insurance
because of testing results he obtained, it seems plausible that he might withhold
those results from an insurer if the insurer might otherwise classify him as a
substandard risk, or deny him insurance altogether.
As stated earlier, underwriting involves classifying applicants by risk." If there
is a possibility that test results could be withheld, the underwriting process falters,
since risk classification becomes less accurate. The underwriter, unable to see
genetic test results, might place the applicant in a standard risk category (with a
standard premium), when the applicant is in fact substandard. The average risk
premium would be lower than normal, leading to more people who are at risk
purchasing insurance. Life insurers believe that they, in particular, should have
access to genetic information? 6 They claim that life insurance is not as significant
in society as health insurance-life insurance only provides a certain lifestyle for
the beneficiary of a life insurance contract, while health insurance provides the
more significant immediate medical care for the policyholder.97
92. The MIB collects health-related information onthose applying for health and life insurance.
After receiving an application from an individual, the insurer may request information from MIB,
to find any health conditions which were unreported by the applicant See THomsFTr, supra note
78, at 127.
93. Robert J. PokorsKi Genetic Infonnation andRisk Classification andAntiselection, 26 J.
INs.MED. 413, 417 (1994-95) (quoting F. Nardi, The Formation ofModern MB, in I ACADEMY
oFLmEUNDERWRrumG 13-1 to 13-7 (1984)).
94. See GIBBONS ETAL., supra note 81, at 69.
95. See Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 67, § 1:2.




The life insurance industry could suffer if the issue of genetic testing is not
handled properly. If a situation arises where no insurer is entitled to genetic
information, antiselection may become more prevalent, premiums may rise, and
existing policyholders may cancel their insurance." The healthy would refuse to buy
insurance, while the unhealthy would purchase large amounts of insurance. The life
insurers might then be forced to either increase the premiums to the point where
each person subsidizes his own sickness or maintain the existing premiums and go
out of business.99
Insurers are not the only parties affected by the advent of genetic testing.
Insurance applicants may also be affected since insurers may require genetic
information when classifying applicants' risk. Issues of privacy and discrimination
fuel many of the arguments against insurers' access to genetic information.
Genetic information is the most private of information. Once in individual is
tested, the result is a blueprint of that individual's genetic makeup."' This blueprint
can be used to trace genes through past generations, predict the likelihood of the
gene's presence in present generations, and can be used to predict their presence
in future generations.' In other words, obtaining one person's genetic information
could lead to finding genetic disorders for that person's parents, siblings, and
childremn°' This could become a concern if insurers discover a genetic disorder in
one person, and they use that information to classify not only the person tested, but
also that person's family members. 3
Some commentators have suggested that a person's autonomy must be taken into
consideration when examining rights of privacy.' With regard to requiring genetic
testing and screening, commentators suggest that autonomy refers to individuals'
rights to make informed, independent decisions about whether they would like to
be tested, and furthermore, whether they want to know the results of the testing.'
Once tested, they argue, privacy rights include making an informed, independent
decision about whether others may access those results, and if so, who may access
those results."° Some have argued that if insurers are entitled to a person's genetic
information, there exists "a 'big brother' scenario where complete strangers know
everything about you and are making decisions about your life."'0 7
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. SeeNATIoNA CNCERINsT., supra note 1, at 10-11.
101.Seeid. at 9-16.
102. See id. at 14.
103. See RuTH HUBBARD & ELIuAHWALD, EXPLODING THE GENE MYTH 141-42 (1993).
104. See Karen Ann Jensen, Genetic Privacy in Washington State: Policy Considerations and
a Model Genetic PrivacyAct, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 357,364-65 (1997).
105. See INsTrruTm OF MED., ASsE sING GENErIC RISKS 248 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds.,
1994).
106.Seeid. at 249.
107. Suzanne E. Stipe, Genetic Testing Battle Pits InsurersAgainst Consumers, BEST's Rnv.:
LmEHALTH INs., Aug. 1996, at 38,43 (citing comments by New Jersey Assembly Democratic




The issue of discrimination is another focus of commentators. As stated earlier,
insurance, through the risk classification process, is discrimination. The key is
determining whether the discrimination is fair or unfair (invidious). A study
conducted by Dr. Paul Billings in 1996 illustrated isolated instances of invidious
discrimination. 08 One example listed in the study involved a mother who applied
for life insurance for her two children.' 9 One of the children had Hurler syndrome,
a genetic condition resulting in mental retardation by the age of ten.' Both of the
children were rejected. The rejection letter informed the mother that the one child
was denied life insurance since Hurler's syndrome is fatal (which is considered fair
discrimination), but no reason was given for the other child's rejection (which is
considered arbitrary, or invidious, discrimination). She was later able to obtain
insurance for the healthy child through another insurer."' An additional study
conducted at Georgetown University in 1997 was able to discover more instances
of isolated invidious discrimination."
2
As a result of the potential infringement upon rights of privacy and unequal
treatment, commentators argue that some people are refusing to get tested to avoid
losing their access to insurance. Dr. Billings' study mentions cases in which people,
who were at risk for genetic disease and were classified as standard risk, refused
to get tested in order to avoid losing that standard rating." 3 These people believed
that their insurance would be denied if they were tested, and the results came back
positive for disease."' Policyholders and applicants may be denying themselves
treatment which may alleviate the condition, and even if there is a treatment,
insurers might not want to classify someone with a genetic disease as a standard
risk. Moreover, there is little information available about many treatments, and
insurers fear the effects of antiselection. For example, people with
hemachromatosis" 5 are generally denied life insurance unless they-receive regular
withdrawals of blood in order to keep the iron level down, thus reducing the
potential for liver and heart damage. These withdrawals, or phlebotomies, cannot
be administered unless the individual submits to a genetic test for the presence of
hemachromatosis." 6
A similar problem exists in individuals who have a family history of Marfan's
syndrome. Individuals with Marfan's syndrome are often tall with long limbs and
generally suffer from weaknesses in the eyes, bones, joints, and heart. Without
108. See Lisa N. Geller et at., Individual, Family, and Societal Dimensions of Geneic
Discrimination: A Case StudyAnaysis, 2 Scm. &ENGIEERINGETHCS 71 (1996).
109. See id. at76.
110. See KowLEs, supra note 20, at 151-52.
111. See Geller et al., supra note 108, at 76.
112.See Donald C. Chambers, Genetic Discrimination: Much Press, Little Substance, MED.
REsoURcE (Lincoln Nat'l Reinsurance, Fort Wayne, Ind.), JanJFeb. 1997, at 3, 3.
113. See Geller et al., supra note 108, at 79.
114. See id.
115. Hemachrmatosis is a genetic disorder where iron accumulates in tissues, leading to heart
and liver damage. Regular phlebotomies (withdrawals of blood) are performed in order to keep the
iron level down and to prevent organ damage. See More Screening Neededfor Hemachromatasis,
GmiEsis REP.-DX (Genesis Group Ass'n), Jan. 1,1996, available in 1996 WL 9660649.
116. See Chambers Interview, supra note 88.
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proper treatment, an individual with Marfan's could suffer a heart attack at an early
age due to an enlarged aorta."' Again, proper treatment can be administered if the
individual has submitted to a genetic test for Marfan's. However, unlike individuals
with hemachromatosis, where these individuals stand with regard to receiving life
insurance is unclear."8
Very few courts have addressed the concerns facing insurers and consumers with
regard to accessing genetic information. Justice Lederberg, Supreme Court of
Rhode Island, has expressed his concerns over the potential issues of rights of
privacy and equal treatment. He stated in his dissent in State v. Almonte"' that
[p]rivacy issues requiring constitutional protection will expand as discoveries
from the Human Genome Project reveal the complete menu of each individual's
genetic components, including the flaws in one's genetic makeup and the likely
time and nature of one's death. Information on whether an individual carries a
gene for Alzheimer's disease or early heart disease would be of interest to
employers as well as insurance companies. 2
Justice Lederberg furthered his concern over the potential misuse of genetic
information inhis holding in State v. Morel.2 Although that case dealt with DNA
testing in the criminal area, Justice Lederberg stated,
This Court is aware of the great promise of DNA research in health care as
well as the potential for abuse and misuse of genetic information. Legitimate
privacy concerns continue to be raised, such as the dangers of unauthorized
access to data banks that can lead to disclosure of genetic information and
possible genetic discrimination by entities such as insurance companies and
employers."2
However, aside from expressions of concern, there is little direction given by the
courts on how to deal with this sensitive topic; few, if any, courts have decided the
issue. Although the federal and state courts have rarely addressed the issue of
genetic testing and insurance, federal and state legislatures have been busy
developing legislation to deal with this issue.
V. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO Tnm LIFE
INSURANCE/GENETIC TESTING Issm
Eric Mills Holmes, in a comprehensive article on the subject, has addressed the
question of whether the issue of insurers' access to genetic information should be
handled by Congress or each state legislature.' He suggests that while the history
of American insurance favors state legislation, genetic information is of national
concern, and thus warrants a "nationally uniform and comprehensive approach,"
24
117. See Dorthy Nelkin & Lori Andrews, Do the Dead Have Interests? Policy Issues for
Research After Life, 24 Am. J.L. & Med. 261,268 (1998).
118. See Chambers Interview, supra note 88.
119. 644 A.2d 295 (R.I. 1994).
120. Id. at 306 (Lederberg, . dissenting).
121.676 A.2d 1347 (R.I. 1996).
122. Id. at 1356.




whichwould be permissible under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. As stated earlier,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed
to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance... unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance."
25
Nearly every state legislature has regulated insurers' access to genetic
information.2 6 However, Congress has been slow to pass such regulation.2 7 The
only federal legislation which deals with this issue directly is the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"). 1' This legislation provides
that genetic information cannot be used as a pre-existing condition by health
insurers. 9 However, federal bills proposed by Senator Olympia Snowel3° and
Representative Louise Slaughter' have gained support in both the Senate and
House of Representatives. These bills, which are nearly identical, are each called
the "Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997," and
they generally provide group health care protection.
In the case of benefits consisting of medical care provided under a group health
plan or in the case of group health insurance coverage offered by a health
insurance issuer in connection with a group health plan, the plan or issuer may
not deny, cancel, or refuse to renew such benefits or such coverage, or any
participant or beneficiary under the plan on the basis of genetic information; or
on the basis that the participant or beneficiary has requested or received genetic
services. 3 2
For life insurers and consumers battling the issue of accessing genetic
information, the proposed Snowe/Slaughter bills, the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 33 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"),"' and HIPAA, seem to present the only available answers at the federal
level. Unfortunately, these legislative responses to this highly sensitive issue are
insufficient protections for both life insurers and consumers alike.
The one central problem with these regulations, as well as the proposed
Snowe/Slaughter bills, is that they all deal with insurers' access to genetic
information with regard to health insurance. They do not deal with the potential for
invidious discrimination with regard to life insurers' access to genetic information
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994); see also American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 84 F.3d 834,
838 (7th Cir. 1996).
126. See Holmes, supra note 8, at 629-44, for a list of the various state legislation regulating
insurers' access to genetic information.
127. See Bornstein, supra note 72, at 579-88, for a list of proposed federal legislation
conceming insurers' access to genetic information.
128. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29
& 42 U.S.C.).
129. See id. § 101 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1181(bX1)(B)).
130. See Geneti InfomationNondiscimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997, S. 89,105th
Cong. (1997).
131. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997, HR. 306,
105th Cong. (1997).
132. S. 89 § 713(aX1),(2).
133.42 U.S.CA. §§ 12101-12213 (1995 & West Supp. 1998).
134.29 U.S.CA. §§ 1001-1461 (West 1999).
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when considering individual life insurance policies. However, many state
legislatures have addressed this issue through varying legislation. Some states have
passed legislation focusing on specific genetic diseases and types of insurance,
while other states have opted for comprehensive legislation, focusing on all types
of genetic conditions and insurance.'
Holmes has expressed concern over the impracticability of the states' approach
to this issue. 3 " The states which have opted for narrow legislation must continually
update their legislation as either advances in genetics reveal new genetic conditions
or new forms of insurance develop. '37 The cost to the public of updating legislation
in each state due to genetic discoveries would be greater than costs imposed by an
individual federal entity responsible for such updating, because that entity could
spread such costs over the nation as a whole. This approach would produce fewer
costs to citizens than individual states spreading the same costs of updating over its
constituents.
Furthermore, states which have adopted more comprehensive genetic testing laws
lack uniformity. "Some define genetic testing broadly, some narrowly. Some
provide explicit privacy protection, some do not. Some prove a private cause of
action under the unfair trade practices law, civil penalties including attorney fees
and costs, and criminal sanctions; others do not."' 38 Some states do not even
mention life insurance with regard to genetic information but have rather adopted
the provisions of HIPAA 39 As a result, a life insurance applicant in one state could
be denied the same coverage that the same individual could have received in
another state with differing legislation.
Holmes has suggested a potential solution of authorizing "fair insurance/genetic
discrimination" for types of insurance purchased for financial protection, such as
life insurance. 4 ' He has also suggested that a more comprehensive ban on access
to genetic information by insurance companies aimed at providing medical care,
such as health insurance, might be more appropriate. 4 ' In other words, public
policy favors protecting individuals from losing their immediate medical coverage
over those losing their future financial protection.
VI. PROPOSAL
Developing risk factors ("RFs"), assigned to each genetic condition discovered
by the HGP and incorporated into each individual life insurer's risk premium
valuation techniques, would be a significant step toward alleviating the tension
between the life insurer and consumer. These factors would be developed and
passed by a federal agency (preferably the Department of Health and Human
Services). Utilizing the agency as a vehicle for passing the RFs would benefit the
general public, the consumer, and the life insurer. The public would benefit due to
135. See Holmes, supra note 8, at 644-49.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 645.
138. Id. at 647.
139. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59A-23E-1 1 (Supp. 1998).




the efficient use of resources, the consumer would be assured of heightened privacy
and autonomy as well as a decreased likelihood of unfair discrimination, and the life
insurer would be assured of a decreased likelihood of antiselection.
A. Taking Holmes a Step Further
Holmes's potential solution of a uniform federal legislation covering insurers
access to genetic information is a valid approach, since the current federal and state
laws are not entirely sufficient.'42 The McCarran-Ferguson Act was premised on
public policy-public interest favored state regulation of the private insurance
industry.'43 However, McCarran-Ferguson explicitly granted Congress the power
to enact legislation pertaining to the business of insurance. 4 4 The drafters of
McCarran-Ferguson may have anticipated a situation where state regulation of
insurance would be insufficient, and public policy would favor federal enactment
of legislation regulating the business of insurance. The issue of genetic testing is
such a situation.
The Snowe/Slaughter bills, and in some ways HIPAA, have addressed Holmes's
potential solution of a comprehensive federal regulation for health insurance
effectively by providing consumers greater access to immediate medical coverage.
However, Holmes's "fair insurance/genetic discrimination" federal regulation for
life insurance, while valid, can be taken a step fArther in order to ensure that the
risk classification practices of these insurers take the genetic conditions themselves
into consideration. As a result, this proposal will focus on the risk classification and
premium setting methods of life insurers.
The "step" referred to is developing risk factors assigned to each genetic
condition discovered by the HGP and incorporating them into each individual
insurer's risk premium valuation techniques. The RFs would be calculated for every
genetic condition discovered to date, and they would be updated as new advances
in genetics provide more insights into these, as well as newly discovered,
conditions. This procedure would be a time-consuming process, but it would be
necessary to ensure that genetic conditions become a part of insurers' risk
classification practices. A question then arises as to who would develop the RMs.
The RFs might be developed by a task force composed of HGP representatives,
insurers, insurance medical directors, law school professors, governmental
representatives, and leaders of special interest groups. The reason for such a
diverse task force would be to facilitate compromise through extensive discussions
and debates concerning each party's viewpoint regarding the RFs. Understanding
and appreciating the arguments that each party makes would be essential to the
creation of the RFs.
One attempt at such an understanding occurred at a roundtable meeting in 1995,
held by the American Academy of Actuaries, designed to provide information on
genetic testing. Participants included insurance company medical directors,
geneticists, underwriters, a law school dean, and a spokesperson for the National
142. See id. at 652-56.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 18, 64-66.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
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Breast Cancer Coalition. "The participants shared information and opinions for
more than eight hours. At the day's conclusion, differences remained, but there was
greater understanding and tolerance for others' viewpoints as well." 4 This
understanding and respect for each others' views could lead to more efficient
dialogue which, in turn, could lead to balanced RFs, reflecting the expectations of
all parties involved.
While perfect compromise through this task force approach is unrealistic, as one
party may try to influence another to set the RFs more in their favor, a general
understanding of each party's point of view facilitates compromise, which is
necessary in developing RFs which benefit both the insurer and consumer.
B. Why Choose the Department of Health and Human
Services?
While the task force approach is beneficial in that it attempts compromise, the RF
proposal would be best served by remitting it to a governmental administrative
agency, preferably the Department of Health and Human Services ("HIHS"). An
agency is an attractive choice because of its flexibility-it permits the hiring of
"people with whatever mix of talents, skills and experience it needs to get the job
done."' 4 6 Moreover, the purpose of creating administrative agencies is to address
"current crises or to redress serious social problems.""" The issue of insurers'
access to genetic information is certainly a serious social problem, and the needs
of the insurers and consumers with regard to this potential crisis should be
addressed.
The choice of the HIHS is attractive due to its interest in health care reform with
regard to genetic information. HIIS Secretary Donna Shalala, on June 26, 1997,
stated that "[p]reventing genetic discrimination by health insurers is an important
step in making sure that no one is treated unfairly because of information contained
in their genes."' 48 The National Institute of Health, a subsidiary of the HHS, has
also published a pamphlet on genetic testing.'49 However, the HHS should not limit
its concern to unfair treatment with regard to health insurance. The medical
underwriting processes utilized by life insurers provide opportunities by the insurer
to practice unfair discrimination. They also provide the consumer with
opportunities to practice antiselection. The HIHS could create a subdivision
designed specifically for developing the respective RFs for each genetic condition
discovered by the HOP. That subdivision (possibly consisting of the aforementioned
HGP representatives, insurers, insurance medical directors, law school professors,
governmental representatives, and leaders of special interest groups) would also be
responsible for updating the RFs as new findings necessitate such changes. The
145. DONALD C. CHAMBERS, LINCOLN NAT'L REINSURANCE, RIsKY BusnqEss: THE CoLLusoN
OF GOmics AND Tnm INsuRANca INDusTRY 5 (1996).
146. ERNEST GELHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, AD msTRATrV LAW AND PROCESS IN A
NUTSHELL 2 (4th ed. 1997).
147. Id. at 1.
148. Statement by HHS Secretary Donna Shalala, U.S. NawswrRE, June 26, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 5713774 (emphasis added).
149. See generally NATIONAL CANCER INST., supra note 1.
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RFs, developed by this subdivision of the HHS, might then become part of an
administrative regulation mandating that life insurers incorporate the RFs into
existing risk classification processes in order to ensure that instances of "unfair
discrimination" are diminished, if not eliminated.
This approach is beneficial because the costs incurred as a result of a federal
agency developing and updating these RFs could be spread across the nation as a
whole, leading to lower costs for each citizen. If each state attempted to develop
and update such factors, the citizens within each state would suffer high costs.
Therefore, from a cost standpoint, RFs developed by the HHS would be in the best
interests of the public.
The HHS would also have better access to resources than the individual states.
The HHS could more efficiently obtain the aforementioned members necessary to
develop a balanced RF, reflecting the needs of both the insurer and consumer. In
other words, the HHS would be more capable of obtaining leaders in their
respective fields than would an individual state agency.
C. What Factors Would the RFs Be Based On?
Once the decision to develop RFs has been made, the question becomes: What
criteria will be taken into consideration when developing these Rs? Possible
factors to be taken into consideration by the HHS subagency might be as follows:
1. The potential treatment and average success of treatment for the condition and
the likelihood of death resulting from the disorder.
2. The average life expectancy of an individual with that particular genetic
condition.
3. The average penetrance/expressivity of the gene (e.g., severity of gene's
expression, average age of onset, etc.).
4. The amount of the average insurance policy taken, or anticipated to be
taken, by a person with that condition.
5. The average expenses incurred for treatment of the condition.
6. The amount that existing policyholders' premiums would increase to make
up for a particular applicant with a particular disorder obtaining insurance.
7. Whether the carrier of the particular gene is merely predisposed, in which
case the average chance of becoming symptomatic is taken into
consideration, or is presymptomatic for a particular genetic condition.
8. The potential effect of genetic testing for a particular condition on
relatives and offspring of that individual.
For example, the RF for a genetic disease which has no treatment (which would
result in higher premiums for policyholders if an individual with the disease was
insured) would be different than the RF for a genetic disease that is treatable (in
which no increase in premiums would occur). In other words, the RF values would
reflect the benefit to the life insurance applicant as well as the cost to the life
insurer for insuring that applicant.
As stated earlier, these RFs would be utilized with regard to the valuation of life
insurance, as well as other insurance designed to protect an individual's financial
future. When insurance is purchased for financial reasons, an individual should
have to pay a premium relative to the risk incurred by the insurer. The higher the
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risk incurred, the higher the premium. The presence of the RFs in valuing these
premiums, however, would ensure that unfair discrimination would be mitigated.
However, with regard to health insurance, these RF values would not play as
large a role, if any role at all. When an individual health insurer provides medical
care protection to a person, it provides something much more important than the
future financial well-being of the insured's family-it provides medical care for the
insured in the event of illness. Health insurers should not be entitled to engage in
risk classification practices in the same was as life insurers. Health insurance is a
medical necessity, and a more comprehensive ban on genetic testing in this regard
would be appropriate. Since health insurers should not be entitled to engage in
these risk classification techniques, it would be inappropriate to suggest that the
RFs should apply to health insurers. The RFs would also be less relevant in the
valuation of group insurance premiums, since statistics from similar groups within
the industry are utilized, and not the personal health history of the employee. In the
event that such information is utilized by employers, the HIPAA and the passage
of the Snowe/Slaughter bills would be effective means of quelling these practices.
D. The RFs Are Beneficial to Both the Life Insurer and the
Consumer
The RF proposal is beneficial in that it lessens the likelihood that unfair
discrimination will not be practiced by life insurers. These insurers would be
forced, through the passage of an administrative regulation incorporating these RFs,
to practice sound actuarial principles. However, the regulation would also give life
insurers the ability to conduct their traditional business of "fair discrimination."
Some isolated insurers might arbitrarily deny an individual insurance due to a
genetic predisposition or presymptomatic condition, without regard for the
established RFs. As a result, the subagency might also be responsible for
monitoring the practices of life insurers to ensure that bona fide risk classification
processes are maintained.
A question arises as to whether life insurers should be able to mandate genetic
testing for a particular condition. The answer, as alluded to earlier, is that since
genetic information is the most private of information, neither mandatory genetic
testing nor unwarranted access to genetic information should become steps in
obtaining life insurance. In the spirit of an individual's right to privacy, life insurers
should not be entitled to genetic information absent the express consent of the
applicant.
With regard to the issue of genetic autonomy, the incorporation of RFs into the
underwriting process would help the applicant weigh the costs of being tested
versus the costs of refusing testing. Individuals would gain general knowledge of
how high their premiums would increase over standard risk premiums if the tests
came back positive. This could be balanced against existing premiums paid as an
"at risk" individual who has not been tested, but has rather submitted the standard
family history forms. The RFs enhance applicants' autonomy through heightened
informed decisionmaking.
The RFs also enhance the autonomy of the life insurers because they could make
more informed decisions about whether to grant or deny life insurance, as well as
the level to set premiums. Just as applicants should not be obliged to provide their
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genetic information, life insurers should not be obliged to provide life insurance
policies. Life insurance is a financial privilege, not a guaranteed right. As a result,
the autonomy of the life insurers, as well as the consumers, should be maintained.
There may come a time, as stated earlier, when genetic testing equipment could
be purchased inexpensively over the pharmacy counter. Life insurers should be
entitled to the results of those tests if individuals would subsequently attempt to
conceal that information when purchasing life insurance. Just as the subagency
would be responsible for monitoring instances of unfair discrimination, it would
also be responsible for developing monitoring techniques to discover instances of
antiselection. The subagency would also be responsible for taking steps to deter
such behavior. The equal playing field theory, in order to flourish, involves
monitoring both the life insurer and consumer.
The costs of establishing a subagency in order to develop and update RFs, as well
as to monitor unfair discrimination and antiselection, could be steep. However,
those costs seem more than reasonable when balanced against the costs of the
potential flood of litigation in the aftermath of the HGP's conclusion.
CONCLUSION
The McCarran-Ferguson act, which gave states the right to regulate insurance,
was premised on public policy. However, Congress was granted explicit rights to
enact legislation regarding the business of insurance. This clause appears to have
been added to address situations in which public policy would demand a more
uniform, federal legislation. Since the issue of genetic testing is of such national
importance, public policy calls for federal legislation in this area.
Federal legislation, which would provide broad consumer protection with regard
to health-based insurance and more narrow protections for insurance providing
financial security, is a valid solution. On the one hand, health insurance provides
a tremendous benefit to individuals requiring immediate medical attention, and as
a result, broad legislation (such as the Snow/Slaughter bills) is an adequate means
of protecting rights to this insurance.
On the other hand, future financial protection, such as that provided by life
insurers, is not as pressing a concern as immediate medical care. However, risk
classification methods of the life insurance industry which arbitrarily discriminate
against individuals with genetic conditions, should not be tolerated. Equally
important to this issue, the practice of antiselection by consumers should not be
tolerated.
The incorporation of the RFs into the premium valuations of life and other
financial-based insurance bridges the gap between the insurer and consumer by
attempting to eliminate potential invidious discrimination from risk classification
processes as well as potential antiselection. Although the costs of implementing the
RF proposal could be steep (involving the establishment of a subagency of the HHS
and the hiring of qualified individuals to develop and update the RFs, as well as to
monitor unfair discrimination and antiselection), the costs of potential litigation in
the aftermath of the HGP's conclusion would far surpass the costs of implementing
this proposal.
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